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thrombosis and hemorrhage, cardio-
vascular consequences, and numbers 
of interventions required; and, not least, 
cost. Th e results might be surprising. It 
would be far from unprecedented for a 
dogmatic belief about how to care for 
dialysis patients to be contradicted by a 
randomized trial. 
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 The Alternative Iranian model of 
living renal transplantation 
 Francis L.  Delmonico 1 
 The experience of the Iranian model should be carefully considered by 
those who suggest a pilot trial of a regulated market in organ sales. 
Mahdavi-Mazdeh ’ s candid report makes clear that a fixed price as the 
basis of regulation is not possible. Iran is proceeding with an 
independent program of deceased organ donation in cities such as 
Shiraz. Mahdavi-Mazdeh ’ s report is encouraging for the prospect of a 
revitalized expansion of deceased donation. 
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 Mitra Mahdavi-Mazdeh is a highly 
regarded physician internationally who 
represents the best of Iranian medicine. In 
this issue of  Kidney International , 1 
Dr Mahdavi-Mazdeh presents a candid 
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and comprehensive review of the Iranian 
model of living renal transplantation. Th e 
Iranian living-donor program has spanned 
two decades, with more than 20,000 ven-
dors participating. 1 Dr Mahdavi-Mazdeh ’ s 
conclusions are poignant and sobering. 
The process of identifying an Iranian 
vendor for a potential kidney transplant 
recipient ultimately occasions a tense 
fi nancial bargaining between the donor 
and the recipient that escapes regulatory 
control. The vendor wants to be paid 
more; the recipient wants to pay less. Th e 
vendors want more because they are poor; 
the recipients want to pay less because 
they may not have the money. 
 Th e experience of the Iranian model 
should be carefully considered by those 
who suggest a pilot trial of a regulated 
market in organ sales. Th is candid report 
makes clear that a fi xed price as the basis 
of regulation is not possible. Th e vendor 
demands more money than is allotted 
by the government ’ s fixed price, in 
what Mahdavi-Mazdeh describes as a 
 ‘ confrontation. ’ And although the fi nal 
interaction may be perceived as broker 
free, the introduction of the recipient to 
the unrelated donor is not, with shopping 
at the 137 kidney-foundation outlets 
throughout the country. 
 Mahdavi-Mazdeh, like other Iranian 
colleagues, rationalizes these realities by 
asserting that the model  ‘ has enabled most 
of the Iranian kidney transplant candi-
dates, irrespective of socioeconomic class, 
to have access to kidney transplantation. ’ 
But the program is not just about recipi-
ents. Th e experience of Iran and the rest 
of the world has clearly shown that ven-
dors are poor, hapless, jobless, indebted, 
and largely destitute. It is this social condi-
tion that compels the vendor to sell a kid-
ney. Th e male – female ratio of 1.6 among 
Iranian vendors is in keeping with the 
published vendor demographics. It is 
exploitation of the poor that has enabled 
most Iranian kidney transplantations 
over the past two decades. Whether a 
vendor resides in Iran or is Pakistani or a 
Sudanese refugee or a Filipino, the funda-
mental unethical aspect is the same — it is 
a victimization of the poor. 
 Mahdavi-Mazdeh acknowledges that 
the Iranian model has, regrettably, pro-
vided little information about such a large 
nephrectomized patient population. She 
has carefully reviewed the literature to cite 
studies showing a less than 1 % risk of 
kidney donors ’ developing end-stage renal 
disease, but none of these references is 
from an Iranian experience. Not cited 
is the reported health status of vendors 
from neighboring Pakistan. Many of these 
Pakistani vendors were bonded laborers, 
some jaundiced, some with inadequate 
kidney function, and some with stone 
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disease or a history of urinary tract symp-
toms. Naqvi  et al. concluded that vendors 
had insuffi  cient renal function and thus 
were at risk themselves for end-stage renal 
failure in the long term. 2 
 Importantly, Iran is proceeding with an 
independent program of deceased organ 
donation, and in certain parts of the coun-
try, such as Shiraz, the program is exem-
plary in fostering that approach. It is also 
commendable and encouraging that the 
Iranian government is now diverting funds 
from the unrelated-donation program to 
deceased donation aft er brain death. 
 Th e World Health Organization is now 
calling upon all governments to address 
the donation and transplantation needs of 
their people. 3 Another assessment of 
the Iranian model (characteristic again of 
Iranian physicians) has been published by 
Fazel and colleagues 4 suggesting that the 
Iranian vendor has a low quality of life and 
is vulnerable to stressful events. Fazel and 
colleagues have also concluded that 
aspects of the Iranian living unrelated 
renal donation program should be reap-
praised for needed changes before it is 
presented as a successful model to the rest 
of the world. 3 Mahdavi-Mazdeh ’ s report 1 
is encouraging for the prospect of an alter-
native focus — a revitalized expansion of 
deceased donation. 
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